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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, ENERGY, AND MARKET ENTRY
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.*
The stated purpose of this symposium is to explore “the extent to which
environmental regulations currently act as a barrier to entry in energy markets and
whether the current regime strikes the right balance between environmental protection
and efficiency.”1 I will discuss three contexts in which I believe that existing methods of
environmental regulation conflict with energy policy goals - - gasoline production,
importation of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and electricity transmission. Before I begin
to discuss the conflicts I see in each of those three areas, however, I need to make explicit
the criteria I am applying to identify conflicts between environmental regulation and
energy goals.
I am using the economist’s concept of allocative efficiency as my primary
normative criterion for evaluating the effects of environmental regulation on energy
policy goals. As Fred Kahn famously said: “The central policy prescription of
microeconomics is the equation of price and marginal cost.”2 Many corollaries follow
from that central principle, e.g., the price of a good or service should include its full
marginal social cost, including any costs it imposes on the environment.3 Thus, for
instance, I see no conflict between pursuit of energy policy goals and environmental
regulations that require energy market participants to make cost-effective reductions in
the costs they impose on the environment and to internalize the residual costs they
impose on the environment. The environmental regulations I identify as creating
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conflicts with energy policy are regulations that interfere with pursuit of energy goals
with little or no resulting environmental benefit. All of the conflicts I identify are
attributable to mismatches between regulatory powers and the institutions that can wield
those powers. In particular, state and local regulatory agencies often act in ways that
conflict with pursuit of national energy policy goals.
Gasoline Production and Distribution
Gasoline-powered automobile engines cause many billions of dollars a year in
environmental damage attributable to air pollution. Beginning in 1970, the U.S.
responded to this problem by imposing increasingly stringent and increasingly costly air
quality rules on both automobile manufacturers and suppliers of gasoline. Generally, I do
not see a conflict between those environmental regulations and pursuit of our energy
policy goals. In fact, I do not think we have gone far enough in our efforts to require
automobile users to internalize the costs they impose on the environment. The residual
environmental damage caused by the use of gasoline-powered engines in automobiles
could justify imposition of a substantial additional tax on gasoline.4 I am increasingly
concerned, however, about the inefficient and unnecessarily costly manner in which we
are regulating gasoline, particularly as it interacts with the environmental constraints on
expansion of the capacity of the refineries that produce gasoline.
Gasoline prices have become increasingly volatile since 2000.5 Moreover, it is
now common for the price of gasoline to vary significantly among states and even among
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localities within the same state.6 Studies of these phenomena have identified two
systemic sources of the increased volatility and variability - - proliferation of gasoline
types and increasingly inadequate domestic refining capacity.7 Both of those phenomena,
in turn, are rooted in environmental regulation. Unless we change some combination of
our environmental regulations applicable to refineries and/or our environmental
regulations applicable to gasoline, we can expect the U.S. gasoline market to perform in
an increasingly unacceptable manner.
Until 1990, there were three types of gasoline sold in the U.S. - - regular, midgrade, and premium.8 The gasoline market was intensely competitive and performed
well. Each type of gasoline was produced in many refineries owned by many different
firms. In addition, each type of gasoline was readily available from numerous foreign
refineries. Local or regional shortages or price spikes were rare and short lived. If a
refinery serving an area shut down unexpectedly or the level of gasoline consumption in
an area was unusually high, supplies from other refineries quickly moved into the area to
eliminate any temporary imbalance between supply and demand. No refiner could
exercise market power unilaterally, and the large number of refiners made collusion
virtually impossible.
Environmental regulations on gasoline imposed by states are changing the basic
characteristics of the gasoline market in ways that have already increased price volatility
and regional variability and that have the potential to increase significantly the risk of
both unilateral and collusive exercises of market power by refiners. As of 2002, there
6
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were twenty-one types of gasoline sold in the United States, eighteen of which were
mandated by states for use in some localities.9 This has already changed the
characteristics of the gasoline market in unfortunate ways. Many types of gasoline are
now produced by only one or a few refineries.10 Many of the gasoline types can be
produced only if a refinery makes a large capital investment the value of which is limited
to the production of that type of gasoline.11 Only a few refineries are willing to make the
investment required to produce many of the new types of gasoline.12 No refinery can
produce economically anywhere near all twenty one types of gasoline that are now
mandated for use in the U.S. The proliferation of gasoline types also has disrupted the
efficient functioning of the gasoline distribution system.13 Each gasoline type must by
separately batch-fed through product pipelines to avoid commingling.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) has summarized the results of our
increasingly fragmented gasoline market.14 With refineries typically operating at or near
capacity, a supply-demand imbalance can occur at any time for a variety of reasons - - an
unexpected refinery or pipeline shutdown or an unexpected increase in demand. When
this happens in one of the localities or regions that uses one of the many unique gasoline
types, the locality or region cannot obtain supplies from neighboring areas or from other
refineries because the neighboring areas use different types of gasoline and other
refineries lack the capability to produce the type of gasoline that is in short supply.15 In
most cases, the area that experiences the shortage also cannot turn to imports because few
9
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foreign refineries are willing to make the capitol investment necessary to produce any of
the many unique types of gasoline mandated for use in various parts of the U.S.16
There are indications that the balkanization of the U.S. gasoline market is also
beginning to have adverse effects on the competitiveness of the market. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has conducted numerous investigations of the U.S. gasoline
market and has a program through which it systematically monitors the performance of
that market.17 Until recently, FTC had never found any evidence of collusion or of
unilateral exercises of market power by any participant in that market. Those results are
not surprising, since the structural characteristics of the market - - a large number of firms
competing in a national market - - rendered either collusion or unilateral exercise of
market power virtually impossible.
In the last five years, however, FTC has found evidence of unilateral exercises of
market power in two cases. In the first case, FTC took no action because unilateral
withholding of capacity to increase prices does not violate antitrust law or any other
federal statute.18 In the second case, FTC filed a complaint in which it alleged that the
firm “used false and misleading statements to induce a government body [the California
Air Resources Board] to issue regulatory standards that conferred market power upon the
firm.”19 An FTC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint on the basis
of his conclusion that the firm’s conduct was insulated from antitrust liability because it
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fell within the scope of the petitioning government defense.20 FTC reversed and vacated
that ALJ decision and has remanded the case for further proceedings before the ALJ.21
It should not come as a surprise that EIA and FTC have begun to detect problems
in the performance of the gasoline market. State environmental regulations have
transformed the gasoline market from a single national market with a large number of
sellers to eighteen smaller markets, each with a small number of sellers.22 When the new
characteristics of the balkanized gasoline market are combined with the low price
elasticity of demand for gasoline and refineries that almost always operate at full
capacity,23 we now have a plethora of distinct local and regional markets each of which is
increasingly susceptible to either collusive or unilateral exercises of market power.
Unless we change our methods of regulating gasoline, these problems are likely to
become much worse in the near future. EIA predicts that recent changes in air quality
regulations will increase significantly the number of different types of gasoline that are
sold in the U.S.24 Thus, for instance, EIA predicts that eight new types of gasoline will
be mandated on the east coast alone over the next few years. As the balkanization of the
gasoline market continues and the number of types of gasoline increases to forty or fifty,
the number of refining firms that participate in each market will continue to decrease and
the risk of both collusive and unilateral exercises of market power will soar.
The primary sources of the growing problems in the performance of the gasoline
market are easy to identify - - environmental regulations that make it impossible to
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construct new refineries in the U.S., and environmental regulations that have increased
dramatically the number of types of gasoline sold in the U.S. All refineries in the U.S.
have been operating at or near maximum capacity in recent years. Both EIA and FTC
have repeatedly warned that we can expect to experience increasing problems in the
performance of the markets for gasoline and other refined petroleum products unless we
increase our refining capacity substantially.25 Yet, almost 50 refineries have closed in the
last decade, and no new refinery has been built in the U.S. in twenty-five years.26 The
capacity of some existing refineries has been increased but not at the rate required to keep
pace with the growth in demand for petroleum products.27
The primary impediments to construction of new refineries and expansion of the
capacity of existing refineries are state and local land use regulations.28 The
environmental regulatory obstacles to construction of new refineries or expansion of
existing refineries are so formidable, and the local opposition to any such proposal is so
determined, that it is hard to be optimistic about the prospect for identifying and
implementing any strategy that is likely to be successful in overcoming those obstacles.
To have any chance of success, any such strategy would have to include some means
through which a federal agency, e.g., the Department of Energy (DOE), could pre-empt
the power of state and local agencies to block or delay interminably the construction or
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expansion of a refinery if DOE determines that the new or expanded capacity refinery is
needed to meet the demand for petroleum products.
The proliferation of gasoline types is primarily attributable to the form of
federalism we have adopted in implementing the Clean Air Act (CAA).29 EPA
determines the maximum permissible concentration of various pollutants in the ambient
air, and states are then required to take the combination of regulatory actions required to
reduce emissions to the extent necessary to comply with the EPA ambient air standards.30
As EPA increases the stringency of the ambient air standards, an increasing number of
localities are out of compliance by an increasing amount, and states must devise new
means of attempting to reduce emissions in the non attainment areas within each state.
Each state responds by imposing different regulations on the composition of the gasoline
that can be sold in each of several non attainment areas within the state. That is the basic
mechanism that produced an increase in gasoline types from three to twenty-one between
1990 and 2002, and that FTC and EIA predict will create a U.S. gasoline market with
forty to fifty gasoline types within the next few years.31 If this gasoline type proliferation
is allowed to continue, along with the persistent and growing shortage of refining
capacity, increased problems with the performance of U.S. gasoline markets are
inevitable.
It is easy to identify a means of reducing the number of types of gasoline that are
mandated for sale in the United States. Congress can amend the CAA by limiting the
discretion of states to mandate particular types of gasoline. Congress took an analogous
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step in 1977 when it detected the risk that states would respond to EPA ambient air rules
by mandating a proliferation of types of cars. Congress recognized that a state-mandated
proliferation of car types would cause significant problems in the performance of the car
market. It avoided those problems by amending the CAA by adding provisions that limit
each state’s power to mandate a particular car type. A state can mandate the sale of
“California cars” or “non-California cars”, but no state can require the production and
sale of a third type of car.32 Congress could impose the same type of restriction on states’
discretion to mandate particular gasoline-types, e.g., a state can require a non-attainment
area to use a “Los Angeles gasoline” or a “Detroit gasoline”, but it cannot mandate sale
of a third type of gasoline.
It is not clear whether such a federal restriction on states’ discretion to mandate
gasoline types would reduce the average price of gasoline in the U.S. Generally, state
gasoline type mandates have been designed to achieve the federally-mandated ambient
air quality at the lowest cost to local gasoline consumers. Thus, for instance, if air quality
goals can be achieved by mandating either a highly clean-burning gasoline that costs five
cents more per gallon to produce or a moderately clean-burning gasoline that costs three
cents more per gallon, a state typically mandates sale of the dirtier but cheaper gasoline
type. States would be precluded from making that type of choice under the amendment
to CAA I propose. I do not know whether the resulting increase in production cost would
be less or more than the savings attributable to a more efficient distribution system and a
market structure that once again renders it impossible for sellers to exercise market
power. Even if the net effect of such an amendment to CAA is to increase the average
32
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price of gasoline, however, I would still consider it a major improvement over the status
quo. Any price increases caused by continuing proliferation of gasoline types are a deadweight loss to society. Conversely, increases in production costs and prices attributable
to increased use of cleaner-burning gasoline are likely to be more than offset by the social
benefits of cleaner air.
Liquefied Natural Gas
Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel. It accounts for twenty-three
percent of the energy consumed in the U.S.33 Its proportionate contribution to U.S.
energy consumption has increased steadily and is expected to continue to increase for the
foreseeable future, primarily because of its relatively benign effects on the environment.34
Eighty-five percent of the gas consumed in the U.S. is produced domestically and another
fourteen percent is imported from Canada.35 Only one percent is imported from other
countries in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG).36
The amount of LNG the U.S. imports must increase substantially over the next ten
years to avoid a large and growing gas shortage.37 Deliverability from Canadian reserves
has leveled off and is beginning to decline, while demand for gas in Canada is continuing
to increase.38 As a result, imports from Canada are projected to decline gradually over
the next decade.39 Deliverability from U.S. reserves that have already been developed is
also declining.40 The federal government has imposed a moratorium on exploration and
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development on lands that contain almost half of the remaining undeveloped reserves in
the country.41 Deliverability from new sources that have not been placed off limits by
Congress or the President cannot possibly keep pace with the expected increases in
demand. As a result, the U.S. must increase its imports of LNG by approximately five
trillion cubic feet per year to avoid a large and growing shortage.42 If the U.S. is unable
to implement that large increase in LNG imports in a timely manner, the price of gas will
increase substantially, with severe adverse effects on both the performance of the
economy and on air quality, as consumers switch to dirtier and less desirable fuels.
There are many reasons for optimism with respect to our ability to avoid a gas
shortage by increasing our LNG imports. There are large gas reserves in many locations
around the world that are not accessible to markets by pipeline.43 With large stranded gas
reserves located in many countries, the global LNG market will remain intensely
competitive, and the U.S. should be able to contract to purchase enough LNG to meet our
needs at reasonable prices.44 Because of technological improvements, the cost of
liquefying, transporting, and regasifying LNG has declined to the point at which imported
LNG is not likely to cost much more than domestically produced gas.45
At the federal level, the legal regime is also a source of optimism. In 2002,
Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act in which it gave the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to approve the construction of onshore
LNG terminals and the Coast Guard authority to approve offshore terminals.46 Each of
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those lead agencies has established an efficient but thorough multi-agency process for
evaluating the environmental, safety, and operational effects of each proposed terminal.47
Over twenty applications to construct LNG terminals have been filed since 2002.48 The
Coast Guard has already approved two applications for offshore terminals, while FERC
has already approved one application for an onshore terminal.49 There is only one
potential problem. Powerful NIMBY-based local opposition to each of the proposed
terminals has emerged, and a variety of state and local agencies have claimed to have
legal authority to block construction of each of the terminals.50 The courts have not yet
decided whether state and local regulatory agencies can block construction of LNG
terminals that have been approved by FERC or the Coast Guard. If the courts conclude
that state or local agencies have that power, the local opposition to LNG terminals is so
powerful that the U.S. will be unable to construct enough terminals to avoid a
catastrophic gas shortage. The resulting conflict between state and local environmental
regulation and national energy policy could only be eliminated by enactment of a statute
that gives federal agencies or federal courts authority to override the decisions of state or
local agencies when those decisions interfere with the nation’s ability to obtain enough
natural gas to meet our needs.51

47

Energy Information Administration, U.S. LNG Markets and Uses: June 2004 Update p. 9.
Id. at p. 1.
49
Id. at p. 7.
50
See, e.g., Christian Schmollinger, CPUC to Appeal FERC Denial of Say Over LNG Terminal
Siting, Natural Gas Week, p.3 (July 12, 2004); Barbara Shook, Texas Asserts Rights on LNG Siting,
Natural Gas Week, p. 6 (June 21, 2004); Jeff Garmano Local Foes Biggest LNG Hurdle, Natural Gas Week
p. 5 (June 7, 2004); John Sullivan, Politics, Not Safety Main Risks to Future of LNG Industry, Natural Gas
Week p. 20 (May 24, 2004); Barbara Shook, Maine Rejects TransCanada LNG Terminal Plans a Second
Time, Natural Gas Week, p.1 (Mar. 15, 2004).
51
A bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives to give federal agencies preemptive
power to authorize LNG terminals, but states oppose it. See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission,
Memorandum Opposing Enactment of H.R. 4413 (July 2, 2004).
48

12

Electricity Transmission
By far the most important conflict between environmental regulation and energy
policy at present is in the context of electricity transmission capacity. The U.S. has a
large and growing shortage of electricity transmission capacity.52 Eric Hirst has
summarized nicely the importance of adequate transmission capacity to the performance
of the U.S. electricity market:
Transmission generally enhances reliability; lowers the cost of electricity
delivered to consumers; limits the ability of generators to exercise market power;
and provides flexibility to protect against uncertainties about future fuel prices,
load growth, generator construction, and other factors affecting the electric
system.53
Over the last twenty years, transmission capacity per megawatt of electricity
generated has declined by thirty per cent, and it is expected to decline by another eleven
per cent over the next decade.54 Capacity declined by fourteen to twenty-seven per cent
in each of the ten electricity regions during the last thirteen years.55 The large and
growing shortage of transmission capacity is already having severe adverse effects.
Inadequate transmission capacity was one of the major causes of each of the price spikes
and blackouts the U.S. has experienced in recent years, including the ten-fold increase in
the price of electricity in California in 200156 and the northeast power blackout in 2003.57
The increasingly inadequate capacity on the transmission grid has forced the National
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Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to increase the number of curtailments of electric
service it has ordered by six hundred per cent over the last five years.58 It now orders
electricity curtailments almost two thousand times per year in the eastern United States
alone.59 In addition, the regional bodies that operate the power grid estimate that
transmission congestion now costs consumers $4.8 billion per year - - in the form of
payments for high cost electricity when lower cost electricity would be available but for a
transmission bottleneck.60
Ashley Brown has identified the primary source of this problem.61 Even though
transmission expansion projects invariably confer large benefits in many states, the state
in which the project is proposed to be implemented has the power to block the project.
To make matters worse, twenty-two states allow localities to block transmission
expansion projects.62 Most proposed transmission expansion projects elicit powerful
NIMBY-based local opposition.63 Project opponents use state and local regulatory bodies
to block implementation of most proposed projects. This problem has become so severe
in many parts of the country that no one is even willing to propose a transmission
expansion project.
The problem is particularly severe in the major metropolitan areas in which most
of the U.S. population lives. Edward Krapels provides a nice description of this aspect of
the problem in his study of the 2003 northeast power blackout:
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“In 90 percent of . . . the United States, it is challenging, but possible, to establish
a mix of generation and transmission assets that constitute an efficient power
infrastructure. In the other 10 percent, it is extremely difficult to do so, and over
time these areas have evolved into ‘load pockets.’ These are typically densely
populated areas where generation facilities were built decades ago, are difficult to
refurbish (and thus highly polluting) and where transmission grids are similarly
dated and compressed.
The majority of the people in this country live in that 10 percent of the
landscape. Thus, the central interest in transmission policy should be—but
seldom is—in the 10 percent of the landscape that contains the load pockets of the
power markets. The load pockets include most of the major American cities, and
so to a significant degree transmission policy should focus on how to bring power
to the people who live in urban areas.64
Over the last decade, FERC has created a competitive wholesale market that
provides many consumers with the benefits of access to a competitive market.65 The
millions of consumers that live in load pockets cannot obtain access to those benefits,
however, during the frequent periods in which transmission constraints preclude
generators outside the load pocket from competing to make sales to consumers inside the
load pocket. During those increasingly frequent periods of time, consumers within a load
pocket are at the mercy of the few firms that own generators within the load pocket.
Our inability to reduce or eliminate the transmission bottlenecks that create load
pockets also has severe adverse effects on the environment. The demographic and
atmospheric conditions in most load pockets make them the worst possible places to
generate electricity. If there were enough transmission capacity into a major
metropolitan area, we could simultaneously reduce the cost of electricity to consumers in
the area and improve the air quality of the area by replacing the electricity generated by
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the high polluting, technologically and economically obsolete generating units in a load
pocket with electricity generated by modern low polluting generating units located in low
population density areas.66 Instead, we are forced to operate the old dirty generating
plants within the load pocket at maximum capacity and even to construct new generating
plants in high population density locations that are poorly-suited to them.67
Ashley Brown has collected a large number of cases from many states to illustrate
the extreme difficulty of obtaining regulatory approval of a proposed transmission
expansion project.68 I will describe two that illustrate particularly well the nature of the
problem. The first case illustrates the decisional framework that a state agency can be
expected to use in deciding whether to approve a transmission expansion project. The
Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board approved a proposed project on the basis of
its determination that the benefits of the project exceeded its costs.69 In Pines Beach
Association v. Energy Facilities Siting Board,70 however, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reversed the Board on the basis that it had erroneously considered out-ofstate benefits in deciding to approve the project. The court held that a state agency can
only consider in-state benefits when it decides whether to approve a project.71 Many
other states have mandated parochialism in this context.72 Of course, even when a state
agency is free to consider the out-of-state benefits of a project, its political incentives are
to consider only the in-state benefits of a proposed project.
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State parochialism has a devastating effect on the prospects of approval of most
proposed transmission capacity expansion projects. Except for projects proposed in
Alaska, Hawaii, or parts of Texas, all transmission expansion projects have beneficial
effects in many states. Yet, state agencies consider only in-state benefits when they
decide whether to approve a project. Thus, for instance, if a proposed project has
beneficial effects evenly distributed over ten states, the state with the power to veto the
project can be expected to exercise that veto power even if the benefits of the proposed
project are nine times greater than its costs. Of course, the situation is even worse in the
twenty-two states that allow localities to veto proposed projects. If one per cent of the
benefits of a proposed project fall within a locality with veto power, that locality can be
expected to veto the project even if its benefits are ninety-nine times greater than its
costs.
The second case illustrates well the difficulty of attempting to reduce transmission
constraints into load pockets. The New York metropolitan area, including Long Island, is
a classic load pocket that is subject to severe and growing transmission constraints.73 In
2001, Cross-Sound Cable Company proposed to expand the transmission capacity into
that load pocket by burying a 330 megawatt cable under Long Island Sound from
Connecticut to Long Island.74 The project was strongly supported by the federal
government, the State of New York, and the regional entities that are responsible for
reliable operation of the transmission grids that serve New England and New York.75
The Corps of Engineers and the National Marine Fisheries Service approved the project
73

Hirst, supra. 53, at 23-24.
Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. McDermott, Chronicles of a Transmission Line Siting, Pub. Util.
Fort. 1,2 (Jan. 1, 2003).
75
Alan G. Schwartz & Bruce L. McDermott, Lessons from the Trenches: Burying the Lines Is
Tough, Infrastructure, p. 2 (Spring 2002).
74

17

on the basis of their conclusions that it would not have adverse effects on fisheries
resources or on navigation.76
The Connecticut Siting Council initially refused to approve the project because its
benefits would accrue primarily to New York residents. On reconsideration, however,
the Council approved the project on the basis of its conclusions that “the proposed project
would enhance the inter-regional electric transmission infrastructure and improve the
reliability and efficiencies of the electrical system here in Connecticut as well as in New
York,” and that “preparedness and cooperation are in the best interests of the State, the
region, and the nation.”77 Cross-Sound soon found out, however, that other institutions in
Connecticut do not share the spirit of regional cooperation and patriotism reflected in the
decision of the Siting Council.
When Cross-Sound installed the cable in 2002, it discovered that the cable laying
ship it hired for that purpose was incapable of burying approximately one per cent of the
cable to the depth specified in its permit.78 Cross-Sound applied to the Corps of
Engineers and to the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (CDEP) for a
waiver that would permit it to operate the cable with a small portion buried to a depth less
than that specified in its permit. Both CDEP and the Corps concluded that such a waiver
would not have adverse environmental effects, but CDEP notified Cross-Sound that it
could not operate the cable on “procedural” grounds without burying one hundred per
cent of the cable to the depth specified in its permit.79 CDEP also notified Cross-Sound
that CDEP could not consider Cross-Sound’s application for a waiver or its application to
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take any other action that would allow it to operate the cable because the Connecticut
Legislature had enacted a moratorium on transmission lines under Long Island Sound.80
Because of the Connecticut moratorium, Cross-Sound was unable to operate its
transmission line until August 2003. Then, in the wake of the northeast power blackout,
the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an emergency order that required Cross-Sound
to transmit electricity to New York.81 In May 2004, DOE determined that the emergency
was over and cancelled the emergency order.82 Cross-Sound then shut down the cable,
but it also asked FERC to authorize it to reactivate the cable. FERC convened a
settlement conference. On June 24, Cross-Sound, New York, and Connecticut,
represented by its Department of Public Utility Control, agreed on a settlement that
would allow the cable to be reactivated.83 On the same day, however, the Connecticut
Attorney General announced that he had not agreed to the settlement and that he was
considering opposing it.84 Thus, the Cross-Sound case remains in a state of legal limbo.
In the meantime, the fate of the Cross-Sound project has sent a clear message to
anyone else who was considering whether to propose a transmission expansion project to
reduce the transmission bottlenecks into the New York Metropolitan area. That message
is: don’t even think about it. Given the powerful opposition to all above-ground
transmission lines, underwater lines were viewed as the only hope to reduce the extreme
level of transmission congestion into the New York metropolitan area.85 If a project
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sponsor cannot even convince state authorities to allow it to operate a critically-needed
underwater transmission line in circumstances in which every agency has determined that
activation of the line will have no adverse effect on the environment, other transmission
expansion projects have no realistic chance of being approved.
The conflict between state and local environmental regulation of transmission
lines and pursuit of national energy goals is already costing consumers many billions of
dollars per year. If it is not resolved in the near future, it will produce even higher
electricity costs and frequent blackouts. The conflict can be eliminated by conferring on
a federal agency or federal courts authority to override the decisions of state and local
governments when those decisions interfere with pursuit of national energy policy goals.
Conclusion
Each of the three conflicts I have identified between environmental regulations
and national energy policy involve state environmental regulation. I have not identified
any clear conflicts between federal environmental regulations and national energy policy.
That is primarily because I have chosen to define a conflict between environmental
regulations and national energy policy as an environmental regulation that reduces energy
supplies or increases energy costs without any significant offsetting environmental
benefit. If I had chosen to define such conflicts to include all environmental regulations
that reduce energy supplies or increase the cost of energy, I would have identified
countless thousands of conflicts between federal environmental regulations and national
energy policy. I reject that broad definition of a conflict, however, because it is
inconsistent with my use of allocative efficiency as my normative basis for identifying a
conflict.
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It should come as no surprise that I have not identified any clear conflict between
federal environmental regulations and national energy policy through application of my
criterion for identifying a conflict. Any time a federal agency is required to decide
whether to approve proposed projects that will create some energy benefits at some
environmental cost, it strives to approve only projects with benefits that exceed their
costs. Similarly, any time a federal agency is required to decide whether to impose
regulations that will create environmental benefits at some energy cost, it strives to issue
only those regulations with benefits that exceed their costs. Federal agencies
undoubtedly err on occasion in making those decisions, but my inability to identify those
errors reflects the difficulty of the task of second-guessing agencies that are required to
make judgment calls in a complicated environment that is fraught with uncertainty.
Conversely, it should come as no surprise that I have been able to identify three
contexts in which state and local environmental regulations conflict in serious ways with
pursuit of national energy policy. Systemic conflicts between state regulation and the
national interest are inevitable. When a state decides to issue an environmental
regulation, it considers only the in-state costs and benefits of the regulation. Thus, for
instance, a state might decide to mandate three new idiosyncratic types of gasoline for
use in each of three non-attainment areas in an effort to minimize the additional cost of
gasoline in each of those areas even though the effect of that decision, combined with
similar decisions by other states, is to create so many different types of gasoline that the
national gasoline sales and distribution markets perform poorly.
Similarly, when a state decides whether to approve a project, it considers only the
in-state costs and benefits of the project. Thus, for instance, a state will veto a proposed
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LNG terminal or transmission expansion project that will create benefits nine times as
great as its costs if all of the costs are incurred within the state and only ten per cent of
the benefits accrue to state residents.
Serious systemic conflicts of this type can be avoided only by creating a better
match between the geographic scope of regulatory actions and the institutions with the
power to take those actions. In each of the contexts I have discussed, we can eliminate
the conflict only by reducing the power of state and local regulators and/or by
transferring some regulatory authority from state and local agencies to federal agencies.
In each case, it would be easy to draft a statute that would avoid the conflict because
Congress has already enacted statutes that eliminate similar conflicts.
The conflict created by state gasoline-type mandates can be eliminated by adding
to the Clean Air Act a provision analogous to the “no third car” provision. In 1977,
Congress recognized the risk that states might inadvertently create chaos in the car
market by mandating the sale of many different types of cars with different pollution
control technologies. Congress avoided that risk by limiting states’ choices of car types.
A state can mandate sale of “California cars” or “non-California cars,” but it cannot
mandate sale of a third type of car.86 Congress could, and should, head off the problems
that are emerging in the performance of the gasoline market by imposing an analogous
limit on each states’ discretion to mandate gasoline types, e.g., a state can mandate sale of
“Los Angeles gasoline” or “Detroit gasoline,” but it cannot mandate sale of a third type
of gasoline.
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The other sources of the conflicts I have identified are state and local land use
decisions that conflict with national energy policy. States and localities are making land
use decisions that make it impossible to construct the refineries, LNG terminals, and
transmission lines that are essential to the nation’s ability to obtain adequate energy
supplies at acceptable costs. Existing federal statutes provide two models that Congress
can use as the basis for statutes that eliminate these conflicts. The first is section 7 of the
Natural Gas Act. That statutory provision authorizes FERC to make preemptive
decisions to authorize construction of interstate pipelines.87 Congress can enact statutes
analogous to section 7 of the Natural Gas Act in which it confers power on a federal
agency to make pre-emptive decisions to authorize construction of refineries, LNG
terminals, and transmission lines. Alternatively, if Congress wants to leave states and
localities some degree of discretion over land use decisions of this type, it could enact
statutes analogous to the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996.88 That statute allows
state and local agencies to make land use decisions that have potential effects on
attainment of national telecommunications policy goals, e.g., decisions to grant or deny
permits to construct cellular phone towers. The statute then instructs federal courts to
review those state and local decisions and to reject those that are inconsistent with
attainment of national telecommunications policy goals.89 Congress could enact
analogous statutes that instruct federal courts to review state and local land use decisions
that have potential effects on attainment of national energy policy goals and to reject
those that interfere with attainment of those goals.
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There is one major problem with my proposed means of eliminating these
conflicts. It assumes that Congress is willing and able to enact socially-beneficial energy
legislation. That is not at all clear. The energy legislation proposed by the Bush
Administration in 2001 and the Bills subsequently enacted by the House and Senate
included some provisions of the type I support.90 In each case, however, those few
socially-beneficial provisions were buried in a mass of other provisions with highly
dubious effects and mixed with an extraordinary amount of pure pork. The effort to enact
a sensible energy statute is being held hostage by members of Congress who are debating
issues like how many additional billions of dollars Archer Daniels Midland should
receive in ethanol subsidies and whether plaintiff’s lawyers should be allowed to earn
billions of dollars in contingent fees by suing the manufacturers of the gasoline additive
MTBE.91 Unless and until Congress becomes serious about enacting a relatively porkfree energy statute, the conflicts I describe will continue and will render it impossible to
have efficiently functioning energy markets.
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